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BALANCING THE VINDICATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES AGAINST THE
EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT:
THE OFFICIAL IMMUNITY SCALE DOES NOT WORK-
BUTZ V. ECONOMOU
The philosophy that constitutional limitations and legal restraints upon of-
ficial action may be brushed aside upon the plea that good, perchance,
may follow, finds no countenance in the American system of government. I
The American system of government was founded on the theory that there
should be constitutional limits on government action. The United States
Constitution lists a number of individual rights to be safeguarded against
governmental encroachment. Concepts of immunity which protect govern-
ment action are anomalistic to the implicit assumption that the sovereign
"can do wrong" and the implicit recognition of the need for accountability
for governmental wrongs. It can be argued that this system of government
can function effectively only if constitutional guarantees are vindicated. Yet,
the doctrines of sovereign and official immunity are firmly entrenched in
American law, operating to deny the vindication of constitutional guarantees
when deemed necessary for the effective functioning of government. 2  Al-
though heightened concern for the protection of individual rights and re-
dress of governmental wrongs has led Congress and the federal courts to
curtail them in many respects, the doctrines endure. 3
In Butz v. Economou, the Supreme Court gave the lower courts further
guidance in relieving the inevitable tension created by the clash between
individual rights and official immunity. 4  Specifically, the Court held that,
barring an exceptional situation in which absolute immunity was essential for
the conduct of public business, the executive officials sued in this case who
1. Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 27 (1935) (Sutherland, J.).
2. See Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Engdahl].
3. Federal immunity law is the concern of the United States Supreme Court in Butz v.
Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978). State courts may apply their own law of immunity when state
officials are sued for state law violations and, hence, need not follow the line of authority dis-
cussed herein unless either a federal officer or a federally protected right is affected.
4. The Supreme Court did not discuss the issue of sovereign immunity which was consi-
dered by the lower courts. See id. at 2899 n.6. Federal sovereign immunity is governed largely
by the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411,
2412, 2671-2680 (1970). The Act waives, in certain cases, government immunity for liability in
tort and confers jurisdiction on the federal courts to decide tort claims against the United
States. In Economou v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688, 690 (2d Cir. 1976),
the court of appeals, citing Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 50 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975), upheld the dismissal of suit against the United States. The appel-
late court reasoned that "the intentional tort' exclusion of the Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970),
would deny the federal courts jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims of malicious prosecution,
abuse of process and libel even if they were cast in constitutional terms." 535 F.2d at 690.
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performed executive functions were entitled to only a qualified immunity.
Executive officials who performed adjudicatory or prosecutorial functions,
however, were entitled to absolute immunity from suit for alleged violations
of the Constitution. 5 This Note will outline the law of official immunity as it
exists today, analyze the basis of the Court's decision and comment on the
deficiencies of official immunity doctrine. Finally, an alternative approach for
balancing the competing interests will be discussed.
EVOLUTION OF OFFICIAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
The immunities asserted by government officials 6 serve either as a total
shield from civil liability or as an affirmative defense 7 in civil damage suits'
for wrongs allegedly committed during the performance of their official
duties. Although such immunity may result in individual injustice, it has
nevertheless been granted because, in the words of Judge Learned Hand, "it
has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by
dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the con-
stant dread of retaliation." 9
Immunity doctrine in the United States derives from the Constitution as
well as legislative and judicial processes. 10 Legislators, both state"1 and
federal, 12 are accorded an absolute immunity for acts within their legislative
role, as are state 13 and federal judges 14 for acts within their judicial role. It
is irrelevant whether the wrong complained of is a common law tort or a
5. 98 S. Ct. at 2910-16.
6. For a more thorough summary of the law in this area, see generally K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES (supplementing K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE (1958)) §§ 25, 26, at 551-98 (1976); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS
987-92 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER]; Comment, Federal Officers-Scope of
Immunity from Damage Actions Available to Administrative Agency Officials-Economou v.
United States Department of Agriculture, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 209, 213-25 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Comment].
7. See, e.g., Burkhart v. Saxbe, 397 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
8. The immunity rule has no application in suits for injunctive or declaratory relief. Rowley
v. McMillan, 502 F.2d 1326, 1331 (4th Cir. 1974).
9. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950),
cited in Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. at 2918 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court
has stated its rationale for recognizing official immunity:
(1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an
officer who is required, by the legal obligation of his position, to exercise discretion;
(2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute
his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good.
Id. at 2906, citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
10. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 240.
11. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (state legislators).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I § 6 (members of Congress).
13. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (municipal police justice).
14. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872) (justice of the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia).
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constitutional violation.' 5 These immunities have their roots deep in the
common law and their application is much more clear than the immunity
granted to state and federal executive officials. 16
It is in the area of executive immunity that the law is filled with subtle
distinctions which recognize differing functions, levels of authority, and
types of immunity. Some executive officials, such as prosecutors, 17 receive
the absolute immunity of the judicial officer because of the quasi-judicial
nature of their functions. 18 This quasi-judicial immunity has operated as a
total exception to-the traditional discretionary function analysis used for
other executive officials.19  Following the latter approach, executive officials
have been granted immunity for discretionary acts done within the scope of
their authority with no immunity granted for ministerial acts. 20  When im-
munity was granted under this rule it was found absolute. 2 1  The level of
15. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 553-54. There has been a dramatic increase in claims for
violations of citizens' constitutional rights. For example, the number of cases brought in the
federal courts under civil rights statutes increased from 296 in 1961 to 13,113 in 1977. 98 S.Ct.
at 2921 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) citing ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, 1977 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 189, Table 11; 1976 Id. 173, Table 17. See
Note, Constitutional Law-Federal Civil Rights Act-Absolute Immunity Extended to Prosecuting
Attorney, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 152, 157 (1976).
16. Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a
Critique, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 526, 527 (1977).
17. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (state prosecuting attorney); Yaselli v. Goff, 12
F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926) affd mem., 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (Special Assistant to Attorney General
of the United States).
18. There is much disagreement as to the parameters of a prosecutor's quasi-judicial immun-
ity. In Imbler, the Supreme Court reserved the question: "whether like or similar reasons
require immunity for those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of
an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate." 424 U.S. at 430-31. More
recently, federal courts have held that prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity in all
cases. See Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978) (prosecutor may be liable if he partici-
pated in altering transcript); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (prosecutor has
only qualified immunity for allegedly perjured testimony); J.D. Pflaumer, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of
Justice, 450 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (prosecutor has only a qualified immunity where his
function is investigatory).
19. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 422-24.
20. For a more thorough discussion of the discretionary function rule and the problems with
its application, see Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 209, 218-25 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe]; Comment, The Discretionary Function Ex-
ception to Government Tort Liability, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 167-68 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Comment]; Comment, supra note 6, at 218-25. Due to the difficulty of distinguishing be-
tween "discretionary" and "ministerial" functions, at least one court has avoided using the rule
altogether. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete,
299 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1963), said that the real question is, "is
the act complained of the result of a judgment or decision which it is necessary that the Gov-
ernment officials be free to make without fear or threat of vexatious or fictitious suits and
allegedly personal liability?" Id. at 659.
21. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). In Barr, the Court granted absolute immunity
to excutive officials exercising discretionary functions within the scope of their authority. Id. at
1978]
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authority of the officer was a factor but only as an aid in determining the
scope of an official's discretion. 22
Like the rule for legislators, 23 judges, 24 police officers 25 and pros-
ecutors,26 the compatibility of the executive immunity rule with the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 27 was eventually tested. While the Supreme Court de-
cided that common law immunities were not affected in other contexts, 28
state executive officials sued under section 198329 did not fare as well. In
Scheuer v. Rhodes"0 and Wood v. Strickland,3 1 the Supreme Court
fashioned its present doctrine of qualified immunity 32 relying little on
analogous precedent and far more on a balancing of needs and interests. 33
Under this doctrine, state executive officials are entitled to a qualified im-
munity of good faith which varies with "the scope of discretion and respon-
sibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared
at the time of the action." 3 4
574. The rule for law enforcement officers is an exception to the rule of absolute immunity for
executive officials. They are accorded only the qualified immunity of good faith and probable
cause since they never had an absolute immunity under the common law. See Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. at 555.
22. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. at 573.
23. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
24. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
25. Id.
26. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as section 1983] provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
28. In those cases, the Supreme Court used the same rationale to justify immunity for
constitutional violations as for common law wrongs. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 418;
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 556-57.
29. Procunier v. Navarette, 98 S.Ct. 855 (1978) (state prison officials); O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (superintendent of insane asylum); Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308 (1975) (school board member); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (governor).
30. 416 U.S. 232 (1974). This was an action brought under section 1983 by representatives
of the estates of students killed on the campus of Kent State University. The complaint sought
damages from the Governor of Ohio and other state officials for alleged unconstitutional acts.
31. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). In this case, students brought suit under section 1983 against
school officials, claiming that their federal constitutional rights to due process were infringed by
their expulsion from school.
32. This immunity is qualified only in the sense that the official must convince the court
that he or she is entitled to it. Once that burden is met, the official is absolutely protected. See
Comment, Accountability for Government Misconduct: Limiting Qualified Immunity and the
Good Faith Defense, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 938, 965 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
33. 416 U.S. at 243. See also Casto, Barr v. Matteo and the Problem of Coequal Protection
for State and Federal Officials, 13 TULSA L.J. 195, 215 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Castol.
34. 416 U.S. at 247.
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A cause of action against federal officials for constitutional violations similar
to the section 1983 action against state officials was sanctioned by the Su-
preme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics.35 As the lower federal courts wrestled with the proper
immunity defense to such an action, 36 it was foreseeable that some would
apply the rule established in Scheuer.37  Not suprisingly, some courts as
well as commentators also questioned the continued viability of Barr v. Matteo,
long recognized as the leading case in this area. 38  However, no other
federal court extended the Scheuer doctrine as far as the Second Circuit did
in Economou v. United States Department of Agriculture.39  By expanding
the reasoning of Scheuer, the appellate court held that all defendant execu-
tive officials in Economou, including administrative officers who perform ad-
judicatory and prosecutorial functions, were entitled only to a qualified
"good-faith, reasonable grounds" immunity.40
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF ECONOMOU
This lawsuit originated as an attempt to enjoin certain administrative pro-
ceedings of the Department of Agriculture (USDA). The USDA had sought
to revoke or suspend the registration of Arthur N. Economou's commodities
trading company following an unsatisfactory audit by the Commodity Ex-
35. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens was an action for damages against federal agents for alleged
violations of the Fourth Amendment. Several courts have since acknowledged its applicability to
other Bill of Rights violations. See, e.g., Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975) (First
Amendment); Mark v. Groff, 521 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1975) (Fifth, Sixth, Eighth Amendments);
States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Schultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974) (Fifth Amendment). Other
courts have been hesitant to extend Bivens. See, e.g., Weir v. Muller, 527 F.2d 872 (5th Cir.
1976) (Fifth Amendment).
36. The Supreme Court expressed no view of the immunity defense in Bivens. 403 U.S. at
397-98. The appellate court on remand held that federal law officers, the officials involved, were
entitled only to that qualified immunity granted to law officers by the common law. Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1348 (2d Cir. 1972).
37. See Brief for Respondents in Opposition at 11-14, Butz v. Economou, 98 S.Ct. 2894
(1978) citing, inter alia, Mark v. Groff, 521 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1975) (held, "the official
immunity doctrine in suits against federal officials for violation of constitutional rights is identical
to the immunity doctrine applied in § 1983 suits"); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 92 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (held, "a qualified immunity, having the same general character as that contemplated by
the Supreme Court in Scheuer, is available to the Justice Department defendants in the present
action"); States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Schultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1159 (4th Cir. 1974) (stated, "the
Court's discussion of the qualified nature of executive immunity [in Scheuer] would appear to
be equally applicable to federal executive officers").
38. See Mark v. Groff, 521 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir. 1975) (which stated that Scheuer
"destroyed the notion of absolute immunity for executive officials"); Comment, supra note 32, at
944 (Scheuer doctrine, "clearly imposes a limitation on Barr"); Note, Federal Executive Inmun-
ity from Civil Liability in Damages: A Reevaluation of Barr v. Matteo, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 625,
625 (1977) (§ 1983 decisions have "cast doubt on the continued vitality .... [of] Barr").
39. 535 F.2d at 688 (2d Cir. 1976).
40. Id. at 696.
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change Authority (CEA). Economou asserted that the Department had insti-
tuted the investigation and proceeding against him in retaliation for his criti-
cism of that agency. When the request for injunction was denied, Economou
filed an amended complaint in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York seeking damages for alleged violations of
common law and the Constitution. 4 1 Named as defendants were the United
States, the USDA, the CEA, and various individuals who had served in an
official capacity 42 during the relevant proceedings. The district court dis-
missed the suit holding that the complaint, as to the defendant agencies, was
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity; and, in apparent reliance on
Barr v. Matteo, that the complaint, as to the defendant officials, was barred
by the doctrine of absolute official immunity. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed as to the officials, holding that none
of these defendants were entitled to absolute immunity. Reasoning that the
Barr principles of official immunity had been "elucidated in later decisions
dealing with constitutional claims against state officials," the appellate court
concluded that these defendants likewise would be adequately protected by
the qualified immunity approved by the Supreme Court in Scheuer and
Wood. 43
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "because of the importance of im-
munity doctrine to both the vindication of constitutional guarantees and the
effective functioning of government." 44
ANALYSIS-A CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION
FOR SOME GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS
After a lengthy discussion of relevant precedent and underlying policy
considerations, the Supreme Court 45 approved the general application of the
Scheuer qualified immunity standard to the federal executive officials in-
volved in this case.4 6  Thus, a federal executive officer exercising discretion
41. The constitutional "causes of action" alleged violations of due process, the First
Amendment and Economou's right to privacy. 98 S.Ct. at 2898-99, 2899 n.5.
42. The individuals were those who had served as Secretary and Assistant Secretary of Ag-
riculture; the Judicial Officer and Chief Iearing Officer; several officials in the CEA; the Ag-
riculture Department attorney who had prosecuted the enforcement proceeding; and several of
the auditors who had investigated Economou or were witnesses against him. Id. at 2898.
43. id. at 2899-2900.
44. Id. at 2897.
45. This was a 5-4 decision. Justice White wrote for the majority, in which he was joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell. Justice Rehnquist filed an opinion, concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
Stevens joined.
46. Id. at 2911. The Supreme Court provided in Scheuer that:
in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive
branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion
and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably ap-
peared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the
[Vol. 28:1
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who willingly or deliberately infringes an individual's constitutional rights in
a manner which he knows or should know is outside of the law is entitled
only to a qualified immunity for his actions. The immunity is total if granted
but qualified in the sense that it will be granted only if the officer can show
that he acted with a good faith belief that his action was lawful and that
there were reasonable grounds for this belief.
The Court then tempered the general rule with two exceptions. First,
there are exceptional situations where it might be demonstrated that abso-
lute immunity is essential for the conduct of public business. 47 Presumably,
the burden is on the official to demonstrate the necessity of absolute immun-
ity in such situations. Second, executive officials performing adjudicatory and
prosecutorial functions within administrative agencies have a full exemption
from liability for their judicial and quasi-judicial acts.4 8
Barr, which accorded absolute immunity to executive officials, was not
overruled but was distinguished from Economou because it did not involve a
violation of "those fundamental principles of fairness embodied in the Con-
stitution." 4 9  Some commentators expected that a constitutional distinction
would be made and that it would be based on the rationale that constitu-
tional violations are more deserving of redress than common law wrongs. 50
The Court, however, did not make the value judgment that constitutional
wrongs are more reprehensible than common law wrongs. 51 In distinguish-
existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all
the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified
immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.
416 U.S. at 247-48.
47. The Court gave no indication of the possible nature of these exceptional situations.
Perhaps the Second Circuit has provided an example in Huntington Towers Ltd. v. Franklin
National Bank, 559 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978). In that case,
absolute immunity was accorded to the Comptroller of the Currency for his decision to declare
a bankrupt insolvent because of the "breadth and character" of the discretion exercised. Id. at
870 n.2.
In Economou, the Supreme Court stated that, in Huntington, the Second Circuit had limited
Enonomou to constitutional claims. 98 S.Ct. at 2905 n.22. This author does not believe that to
be an accurate reading of the appellate court's holding in Huntington. Absolute immunity in
that case turned on the nature of the discretion exercised by the executive official and not the
nature of the claim asserted by the plaintiff. See 559 F.2d at 870 n.2. The Second Circuit did
not limit Economou; the Supreme Court must assume full responsibility.
48. Hearing examiners or administrative judges, agency officials who are responsible for the
decision to initiate or continue proceedings subject to agency adjudication, and agency attorneys
who arrange for the presentation of evidence on the record in agency adjudications are all
absolutely immune from liability for these particular functions. 98 S.Ct. at 2914.
49. Id. at 2905.
50. See Comment, supra note 6, at 229 (common law claims warrant less protection than
constitutional claims); 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 861, 870-71 (1977) (constitutional rights are of
greater importance than other individual interests).
51. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, implied that the majority had made such a value
judgment and argued that it is illogical to place individual rights into a hierarchy based on
whether they were "enshrined in the Constitution." 98 S.Ct. at 2919 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1978]
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ing Barr, the Court's analysis instead focused on the constitutional violation
as a type of limit on official conduct rather than as a type of wrong committed
against an individual. The Court stated that the official receives a lesser
standard of immunity because when he has violated a constitutional guaran-
tee, he has overstepped the limits of his official duties; and when he over-
steps the limits of his authority, be those limits statutory' or constitutional,
he has no claim to absolute immunity. 52
The Court reasoned that Kendall v. Stokes, 53 Spalding v. Vilas 54 and Barr
v. Matteo 55 did not control this case because in none of those cases did the
official exceed the general scope of his authority. In Kendall, the Postmaster
General made a mistake in the exercise of his discretion while performing
his normal duties. He was found not liable for an error in judgment. 56
Spalding involved a situation where the Postmaster General did not make a
mistake of law or fact nor did he exceed his authority. Therefore, he was not
liable even though he might have acted maliciously. 57  Barr extended this
immunity with respect to state tort claims to a situation where there was
both a factual error and a deliberate misuse of authority.5 8  The Economou
Court reasoned, however, that Barr did not abolish liability for actions
"manifestly and palpably" beyond the line of duty. 59
Precedent involving non-constitutional claims was cited to support the
proposition that federal officers are liable in damages for acts utterly beyond
their authority.6 0  Thus, Barr did not depart from the general rule that a
federal officer must stay within the "limitations which the controlling law has
placed on his powers." Neither mistake, malice, nor corrupt motives push an
act beyond the line of duty, however any unconstitutional act is as much an
unauthorized act as if the official had exceeded the statutory authority of that
office. 6 1 There was no immunity for unconstitutional acts because, not
52. Id. at 2902-03.
53. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 86 (1845). This suit involved a contract claim against the Postmaster
General for erroneously suspending payments to a creditor of the Post Office.
54. 161 U.S. 483 (1896). This suit against the Postmaster General alleged that he had
maliciously issued a circular as an official act which injured plaintiffs reputation and interfered
with his contractual relationships with his clients.
55. 360 U.S. 564 (1959). This was a damage action brought against the acting director of a
government agency for issuance of a libelous press release.
56. "Having 'the right to examine into this account' and the right to suspend it in the proper
circumstances, . . . the officer was not liable in damages if he fell into error, provided, how-
ever, that he acted 'from a sense of public duty and without malice.' " 98 S.Ct. at 2903,.citing
44 U.S. (3 flow.) at 98-99.
57. 98 S.Ct. at 2903-04.
58. Id. at 2904-05.
59. id. at 2902.
60. Id. In the early case of Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804), Chief Justice
John Marshall held a Navy commander liable in damages for the unauthorized seizure of a
foreign cargo ship. Later, in Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877), officers who seized alcohol in a
locality not authorized by statute were held liable in damages.
61. 98 S.Ct. at 2902-05. Justice White stated that "if they are accountable when they stray
beyond the plain limits of their statutory authority, it would be incongrous to hold that they
[Vol. 28:1
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being "authorized in contemplation of law," they were not legally capable of
being authorized. 62
This interpretation of precedent is logical and consistent with the ideal of
limited government. However, it was criticized by the dissenters who re-
fused to acknowledge unconstitutional acts as beyond the limits of gov-
ernmental authority. Justice Rehnquist, author of the dissenting opinion, did
not explain why statutes but not the Constitution itself place limits on an
executive official's authority. Instead, his reasoning equated unconstitutional
acts with authorized acts which are mistakenly or maliciously performed.6 3
The dissenting opinion displayed outright disdain for complaints which allege
constitutional violations. 6 4  The dissenters appear to reason that absolute
immunity should be granted because constitutional claims cannot be taken
seriously in most cases. There is no justification, however, for allowing
executive officials to go beyond the limits of their constitutional authority
with impunity simply because our judicial system finds it difficult to distin-
guish between valid and invalid claims.
In addition to precedent, the majority alluded to sound reasoning for
treating cases of constitutional violations differently from Barr and its pre-
decessors. Since federal law is supreme, federal officials who are executing
their duties under federal law need protection from state interference. 6
5 If
federal officers had no immunity from damages for violations of common or
statutory law, the states could thereby thwart the enforcement of federal
law. This is the fundamental rationale for federal executive immunity doc-
trine, 66 but it provides no support for granting federal officials immunity
when they violate constitutional law which is superior and not subservient to
all other federal law. 67
Following the Court's reasoning, a federal executive official who violates a
constitutionally protected right should be deprived of all immunity. 68 The
Court acknowledged that the line of precedent it cited did not expressly call
for a qualified immunity. 69 If that is true, the Court expanded rather than
restricted traditional immunity doctrine by granting a qualified immunity for
actions by federal officials which transgress constitutional limits. Justification
for this expansion was found in the analogous precedent of section 1983 ac-
may nevertheless willfully or knowingly violate constitutional rights without fear of liability." Id.
at 2905.
62. Id. at 2903. See also Engdahl, supra note 2, at 48-49.
63. See 98 S.Ct. at 2917-19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
64. Several of Justice Rehnquist's statements betray a cynical attitude toward constitutional
claims, such as "where violation ... may be readily converted by any legal neophyte into a
claim of denial of procedural due process," id. at 2919; or, "anytime a plaintiff can paint his
grievance in constitutional colors." Id. at 2918.
65. 98 S.Ct. at 2905.
66. See id. at 2902.
67. See 98 S.Ct. at 2905.
68. See id. at 2903. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 991.
69. "This is not to say that considerations of public policy fail to support a limited immunity
for federal executive officials." 98 S.Ct. at 2911 & n.34.
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tions against state officials. Those decisions looked to the public policy con-
siderations supporting prior case law and balanced the competing interests
involved. Since immunity doctrines were judicially created, the Court consid-
ered itself fully competent to determine the appropriate level of immunity
necessary to protect government interests. 70
The bridge to the analogous section 1983 precedents is of course Bivens,
but the Court's treatment of Bivens may be one of the most curious aspects
of the decision. Although the' Court continued its "laissez-faire" attitude to-
ward the extention of a "Bivens" cause of action to constitutional violations
other than the Fourth Amendment, 71 the Court cannot escape the fact that
the present case involved more than Fourth Amendment violations. 72  Sev-
eral of the appellate court decisions which it cited with approval for their
treatment of the immunity issue also involved other constitutional viola-
tions. 73 In discussing immunity to these actions, the Court tacitly admitted
that such actions exist. More importantly, the Supreme Court's arguments
for a coequal immunity doctrine in Economou urge the extension of Bivens.
Both the recognition of a cause of action and the limiting of the immunity
doctrine serve the same ultimate purpose of the vindication of constitutional
rights. Absent congressional direction to the contrary or other compelling
reasons, it is untenable to draw distinctions in granting a cause of action for
damages just as it is to draw distinctions in immunity law between federal
and state officials. 74
The section 1983 cases are not controlling but merely instructive 75 as to
the way in which the Court had previously analyzed the public policy con-
siderations underlying the official immunity doctrine. The objective was the
same: to reconcile "the plaintifrs right to compensation with the need to
protect the decision-making processes of an executive department." 76 The
focus of analysis here was the nature of the wrong involved. Since the nature
of the wrong in either a "Bivens" or a section 1983 action is identical, tile
Court would not recognize a distinction in the immunity given for several
reasons. First, the lower courts have not so distinguished the immunities
70. Id. at 2909. See also Note, A Judge Can Do No Wrong: Immunity is Extended for Lack
of Specific Jurisdiction, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 1219 (1978).
71. The Supreme Court refused to consider the issue. 98 S.Ct. at 2900 n.8. See Lehmann,
Bivens and Its Progeny: The Scope of a Constitutional Cause of Action for Torts Committed by
Government Officials, 4 HASTINGS L.Q. 531, 542 (1977); Comment, Constitutional Law-
Remedies-Court of Appeals Avoids Constitutional Tort Issue in "Government Action" Case by
Employing Contractual Analysis -Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 311, 321 (1976)
(Supreme Court has elaborated very little on Bivens).
72. See note 41 supra.
73. 98 S.Ct. at 2900 & n.9. See note 35 supra.
74. See 98 S.Ct. at 2908-09.
75. See id. at 2905.
76. Id. at 2909. The Court is not bound by its prior decisions in similar situations. See note
69 supra and accompanying text. In each case the Court has made a considered inquiry into not
only the historic rule at common law, but more importantly "the interests behind it." See
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 421.
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and their reasoning has been sound. In light of this, the government was
unable to show any significant reason to distinguish between "Bivens" ac-
tions and section 1983: both would similarly be drained of meaning if execu-
tive officials had absolute immunity. 7 7  Further, there is no congressional
direction to grant differing immunities. 78  Finally, the Court believed that
their own analysis in Scheuer could not be limited to state officials since it
relied on federal as well as state precedents and analyzed policy considera-
tions and stated conclusions in universal and not limited terms.
79
Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the court of appeals that
executive officials performing executive functions were entitled to merely a
qualified immunity. This was not particularly startling, nor was it startling
that the Court rejected the application of that line of reasoning to executive
officials who perform adjudicatory or prosecutorial functions in administrative
agencies. If one accepts the premise that judges and prosecutors are entitled
to absolute immunity, 80 then it is logical to determine that the "functionally
comparable" roles of individuals within the framework of agency adjudication
also entitle them to absolute immunity.
The Court has consistently held that absolute immunity is needed for ju-
dicial and quasi-judicial acts."' Because great interests are at stake, losing
parties might often retaliate against the individuals involved. The Court be-
lieves our system of justice would suffer if judges and prosecutors were in-
timidated or biased by the fear of personal damage actions. 82 They did not
agree with the court of appeals that circumstances surrounding administra-
tive proceedings are sufficiently different from judicial proceedings to justify
a lesser immunity. 83 In arriving at this conclusion, the Supreme Court
deemphasized the placement of these officials within the executive
branch.8 4  Rather, they stressed the similarity of characteristics and
safeguards present in both judicial and administrative processes. 85
77. See 98 S.Ct. at 2907-08. The argument that Bivens would be drained of meaning if
absolute immunity were granted is further evidence that the Court has silently extended the
"Bivens" cause of action. Congress has abrogated sovereign immunity to allow an action directly
against the state for the type of constitutional violation that took place in that case. See 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h), as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50. Therefore, unless the Court
has recognized a cause of action for other constitutional violations, people in Bivens' shoes
already have an adequate remedy at law. See 98 S.Ct. at 2920 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 2907.
79. See id. at 2909.
80. That premise has its critics. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 566-67 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Note, Civil Rights-Section 1983 Damages-Prosecutor Has Absolute Immunity From Civil
Liability for Acts Committed Within the Scope of His Duties, 47 Miss. L.J. 812, 820 (1976)
(immunity based on an actual malice standard would better serve the public interest).
81. See notes 13, 14 and 17 supra. The area of absolute immunity is very broad, extending
to any act "within the general scope of their jurisdiction.'" 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 354.
82. See 98 S.Ct. at 2912-14.
83. See Economou v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 535 F.2d at 694-96.
84. See 98 S.Ct. at 2913.
85. See id. at 2913-15.
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In both situations, there are divisive conflicts, judgments made upon the
evidence, an independent trier of fact and the correctability of error through
some sort of appeal process. The Court gave particular attention to the
safeguards present in administrative proceedings, citing provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act.8 6  In light of these safeguards, the risk of
unconstitutional actions is outweighed by the importance of preserving the
independent judgment of the people involved.8 7
The Economou decision should not be criticized either for a failure to
follow precedent or for a lack of logical consistency. Rather, the Supreme
Court must be faulted for its futile attempt to perfect a doctrine of official
immunity which does not serve its stated purposes and should be discarded.
A POOR BALANCE WAS STRUCK
The official immunity doctrine operates to deprive individuals of remedies
for many wrongs committed by government officials in ways which have no
logical relationship to the injury committed or the worthiness of the claim
for remedy. It may dampen the zeal of many fine public servants 88 while it
allows others to be fearless when perhaps they should not be.8 9
Under the scheme devised by the Court in Economou, Arthur Economou
could not seek a remedy if his injury was caused by officials responsible for
the conduct of the administrative hearing. If his injury was caused by other
executive officials, they would have the burden of establishing a "good-faith,
reasonable grounds" defense to their actions. Arthur Economou, however,
did not care what type of government official violated his constitutional
rights. 90 He probably was not concerned with the good faith of the officers
either; yet he was denied recovery if good faith could be established. 9 1
Perhaps there are some government interests which are so strong that
individual interests must be subordinated. However, the Court should do
more than speculate about the greater likelihood of damage to adjudicatory
than executory processes which might result if only a qualified immunity
were also granted in judicial contexts. 92 And given its heavy reliance on the
86. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (proceedings are adversarial); § 554(d) (trier of fact is insu-
lated from political influence); § 557(c) (findings and conclusions are made public) (1970).
87. See 98 S.Ct. at 2915.
88. See Comment, supra note 20, at 164-66.
89. See Vaughn, The Personal Accountability of Public Employees, 25 AM. U.L. REv. 85,
94-95 (1975).
90. In complex administrative proceedings, it will often be difficult to establish precisely
which officials were responsible for the injury.
91. See Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1532, 1554-56 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Dellinger].
92. The absolute immunity of the Legislative Branch is constitutionally defined. It is often
noted, with irony, that the only judicially-created immunities which remain absolute are those
which protect judicial and quasi-judicial officers. See, e.g., 98 S.Ct. at 2922 n.* (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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Constitution as a limit to executive authority, the Court should have made
some attempt to explain why there are no like constitutional limits on judi-
cial or quasi-judicial authority. 93 Our system of justice should not suffer,
but rather be enhanced if all its representatives are required to stay within
constitutional bounds.
The Court's opinion is nearsighted in another regard. In light of its force-
ful argument that defending against personal liability suits would be too
great a burden for judicial officers, 94 its lack of concern for the burden it has
imposed on executive officers is distressing. The burden may be justifiable,
but it is a far heavier one than the Court chooses to recognize.9 5 In
Scheuer,9 6 and again in Economou,97 the Court casually suggested that a
qualified immunity could often be established on motion for summary judg-
ment, reducing the incidence of lengthy trials for executive officials. But, the
federal courts have been reluctant to grant summary judgment in such cases
because good faith is dependent on motivation. The validity of such a de-
fense is ordinarily a question of fact. 98 While the amount of time federal
executive officials will now spend defending their discretionary acts cannot
be precisely known,99 it is known that this time, however great, will be time
spent away from their public duties.
ABROGATION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-A BETTER APPROACH
The alternative suggested again and again by commentators and some
judges is an abrogation of sovereign immunity. 10 0 This approach would
have provided a solvent defendant for Economou had he prevailed. 10 1 It
would also allow the government itself to allocate the time and energies of
its employees in defending against such actions. Although the government
acts through its agents, it is the power and authority of the government that
makes these constitutional wrongs so serious. 10 2 Abrogation of sovereign
93. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 566-67 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Stump v. Sparkman,
98 S.Ct. 1099 (1978), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity
where a judge who had ordered an involuntary sterilization was sued for the alleged deprivation
of a constitutional right to procreate.
94. See 98 S.Ct. at 2912 & n.36.
95. But see Casto, supra note 33, at 226 (no indication that Scheuer resulted in a flood of
litigation).
96. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 250.
97. 98 S.Ct. at 2911.
98. See, e.g., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1329 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47
U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1978) (No. 78-345) (good faith a question for jury in section 1983
action); Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1978) (dismissal without a hearing sel-
dom appropriate when defense of immunity is pleaded).
99. See Note, Torts-Defamation-Governmental Immunity-Absolute Versus Qualified Im-
munity for Executive Employees, 23 WAYNE L. REV. 237, 246 (1976).
100. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. at 422 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Dellinger, supra note 91, at 1556; Engdahl, supra note 2, at 59.
101. The plaintiff who prevails in an action against a government official may still be denied
recovery if the defendant is judgment-proof. See Engdahl, supra note 2, at 58.
102. See Comment, supra note 32, at 972.
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immunity has the advantage of providing a remedy to all wronged individu-
als while relieving government officials of the burden of having to defend
personally against such actions. 10 3 Moreover, there is little evidence that
the threat of personal liability deters official conduct. Rather, it would seem
that the fear of discipline or the demands of superiors are far more effective
in keeping official conduct within constitutional bounds. 10 4
The federal government and a growing number of states have found it
financially and otherwise feasible to assume liability for government acts of
negligence and omission. If the abrogration of immunity for tort claims has
not interfered with the functioning of government, nor threatened to bank-
rupt the treasury, it is difficult to conceive of any great danger resulting
from the abrogation of immunity for constitutional claims. 10 5
CONCLUSION
Economou will change the prevailing law of official immunity very little.
Unfortunately, the present law is neither a very good vehicle for vindicating
constitutional rights nor for promoting the effective functioning of govern-
ment. It is beyond question that our system of government places a high
value on the right of the individual to be free from government abuse. This
principle does not function well, however, if government abuses go un-
checked. Personal official liability creates little pressure for the government
itself to change the system which is ultimately responsible for allowing con-
stitutional abuses to flourish. l06 The abrogation of sovereign immunity is
both a preferable and a feasible means of balancing the competing interests.
It was just as surely judicially created in the United States as was official
immunity, 10 7 but if sovereign immunity is to be abolished, Congress, and
not the Supreme Court, will most likely accomplish the task.' 08 The Court
has the power but it has shown little inclination to alter its own creation.
Barbara Bertok
103. Personal official liability probably developed in the United States as a method of enforc-
ing constitutional limitations against the state at a time when the state needed immunity to
prevent financial collapse. See Engdahl, supra note 2, at 11, 19.
104. See Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort Liability, 55 MICH. L. REv. 201, 216-17 (1956);
Comment, supra note 32, at 973.
105. Unless we are to make the quite remarkable assumption that the probability of
unconstitutional or otherwise wrongful positive acts by our governments is so
much greater than the probability of negligence in the performance of official tasks
that the former, unlike the latter, constitutes an unacceptable risk, it is difficult to
imagine any sound argument from fiscal necessity against the elimination of im-
munity for such claims.
Engdahl, supra note 2, at 59.
106. See Dellinger, supra note 91, at 1556; Engdahl, supra note 2, at 58; Jaffe, supra note
20, at 230.
107. See W. PROssER, supra note 6, at 971.
108. See note 5 supra.
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